DC Domestic Violence Legal Reading
DC Code Intrafamily Offenses Act
https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/titles/16/chapters/10/
Salvattera v. Ramirez,111 A.3d 1032, 1037 (D.C.2015) (“[T]he trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, should only enter a CPO against a party for reasons consistent with the underlying purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act.”) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted);
Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C.2005) (“[T]he broad remedial purpose of the Intrafamily Offenses Act ... is[ ] to protect victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence.”);
Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C.1993) (“The Intrafamily Offenses Act is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.”).
Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032, 1035 (D.C.2015)
This court has previously and consistently recognized that “the plain intent of the legislature [in amending the Intrafamily Offenses Act] was an expansive reading of the Act, which we think must be accorded to the catchall provision as well.”
Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973, 974 (D.C.1988). Moreover, the committee report described the catch-all provision as “a very broad one,” and the provision itself remained unchanged. Report on Bill 4–195 at 10 n.*.
DC Superior Court Rules
www.dccourts.gov/superior-court/rules
Cases
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)
In "true-threats" cases, the State must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of their statements’ threatening nature, but the First Amendment requires no more demanding a showing than recklessness.
Mashaud v. Boone, (D.C. 2023)
When speech is at issue, D.C.'s stalking statute only covers speech that fits within well-defined narrow classes that have traditionally been excepted from First Amendment protections, including threats, obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct. However, when the statute can be applied to contact or communications in a content-neutral manner (i.e. ignoring the content of communications), there is no First Amendment implication.
Carome v. Carome, (D.C. 2021)
The holding of Ramirez extends to initial determinations, specifically, a trial court must consider prior relevant acts in making the threshold determination of whether there is good cause to believe that an intrafamily offense occurred.
When a trial court revisits a CPO petition on remand based on an error in the original ruling, the trial court's renewed inquiry is not limited to whether its initial decision was correct based on the original record. The trial court may supplement to original record by considering evidence of any relevant developments that occurred in the time between the trial court's initial ruling on the CPO petition and the Court of Appeals' remand decision.
Mashaud v. Boone, (D.C. 2021)
Entry of CPO reversed and case remanded for the trial court to consider whether Respondent sending a series of emails and Facebook messages to Petitioner’s contacts discussing Respondent’s extramarital affair with Petitioner’s wife constituted stalking for the purposes of D.C. Code § 22-3133(a)(1)-(3) given that speech about matters of private concern may enjoy constitutional protection. D.C. Code § 22-3133(b) provides a statutory exception to the definition of stalking for constitutionally protected activity. The Court has not “delineated the contours of the statutory exception for ‘constitutionally protected activity,’ and the text of D.C. Code § 22-3133(b) does not provide an unambiguous answer.” The trial court erred in relying on the finding Respondent’s speech was related to a matter of private rather than public concern in determining it was not constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. In remanding, the Court notes they would not do so if they were “persuaded at this juncture that the CPO was invalid either because it violated appellant’s First Amendment rights or because the stalking statute did not apply to appellant’s activity,” and that “the trial court might have reached the same conclusion even if it had understood that communications about particular matters of private concern enjoy a measure of constitutional protection.”
Ramirez v. Salvaterra, (D.C. 2020)
A CPO can be extended if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence first that there is good cause to extend the CPO, based upon the entire mosaic of the case, meaning that there is a cognizable danger that the respondent will commit or threaten to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner in the coming year if the CPO is not extended, and second that the balance of the potential harms to each party merits an extension.
““Good cause” is defined as a cognizable danger that the respondent will commit or threaten to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner in the coming year if the CPO is not extended. In making this determination, the court must evaluate the entire mosaic of the case, including the parties’ relationship and interactions both before and after the issuance of the CPO and any prior extension of the CPO, as well as the parties’ current circumstances.” Ramirez v. Salvaterra at 3.
“In balancing the harms, the trial court should examine multiple factors, including, but not limited to, safety (and resulting peace of mind), restraints on liberty, restraints on property, family interests, social stigma, and other collateral consequences and relevant circumstances. The court may accord different weight to different potential harms, analyzing the totality of the circumstances to balance the harms and exercising its discretion to fashion a CPO extension that is tailored to the situation of the parties.” Ramirez v. Salvaterra, at 42.
Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d 983 (D.C. 2016)
Civil Protection Order based on parental kidnapping is proper when parent took child out of car and into office building for approximately three minutes.
“We see no basis for interpolating minimum duration or distance requirements into § 16–1022(b)(1), which by its terms extends to any abduction, taking, or carrying away, without regard to duration or distance. We have held with respect to the general kidnapping statute that there is no requirement that the victim be moved any particular distance or held for any particular length of time.” Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 988.
"We have never held or even suggested that proof of subjective fear by the CPO petitioner or anyone else is a prerequisite to issuance of a CPO." Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 989.
"[T]he conclusion that Ms. Fleet precipitated the incident neither justifies Mr. Fleet's response nor precludes the trial court from issuing a CPO based on the totality of the circumstances." Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 990.
"[A]" trial court considering whether to issue a CPO should “look at the entire mosaic of facts.” Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 990.
Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032 (D.C. 2015)
The catch-all provision of the statute, in extraordinary circumstances, can be used to order a Respondent to vacate a dwelling, even if it is not a dwelling shared with Petitioner.
“We have long recognized that the Intrafamily Offenses Act “is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C.1993). Because a protection order “was designed to protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence,” the act “gives the court ‘a wider range of dispositional power.” Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d at 1034.
“[T]he trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, should only enter a CPO against a party for reasons consistent with the underlying purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act.” Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d at 1037.
Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super. 2014)
Petition for CPO denied when Respondent’s behavior did not exhibit a course of conduct to support a finding of violation of DC stalking statute.
"Respondent's flyers and website qualified as 'constitutionally protected activity' exempt from the District's stalking statute. D.C. Code § 22-3133(b)." Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super.,2014) at 5.
"[S]omeone who creates written messages and then delivers them directly to another person against the listener's wishes in order to, or in a manner he knew would, upset the listener could be found guilty of stalking. This could be so even if the content of the speaker's message and methods of communication resemble traditionally protected speech." Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super.,2014) at 14.
“The evidence presented at trial contained not nearly enough proof that Respondent engaged in such a course of conduct to support a finding that he violated the District's criminal stalking statute. Petitioner's contention that Respondent created and distributed the flyers in order to expose Petitioner to them12 was largely undermined by the fact that Respondent did not attempt to deliver them directly to Petitioner in her office (where, in fact, he is legally obligated to go on a regular basis); rather, Respondent left the flyers in locations where others, not Petitioner herself, found them.” Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super.,2014) at 16.
A.S. v. Cannady (D.C. Super. 2014)
CPO granted when Respondent scratched Petitioner’s car after the end of their romantic relationship due to threatening nature of the act.
"[W]here an act of destruction of property potentially serves as a precursor to, threat or instigator of, or substitution for violence, or otherwise comprises part of a violent or intimidating pattern of domination and control, the issuance of a CPO would properly serve the IFA's broad goals of "protect[ing] victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence," Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C. 2005) (citation omitted), and of reducing "physical, sexual or emotional violence," Richardson, 878 A.2d at 1217 n.6. Where, however, such factors are not present, and the act of destroying or damaging property appears unconnected to violence, possible violence, or a pattern of control, issuance of a CPO based upon a finding of malicious destruction of property would not comport with the statute's goals, and would thus not be proper." A.S. v. Cannady (D.C. Super., 2014) at 10.
Cave v. Scheulov, 64 A.3d 190 (D.C. 2013)
Reaffirmed the two-step approach for granting fees in a Civil Protection Order case: (1) whether to award fees, (2) and if so, how much. The factors for the first step should not include "oppressive or burdensome litigation" but should include "motivation and behavior." The factors for the first step should also include "results obtained" and the policy considerations of the Intrafamily Offenses Act.
"Based on the policy underlying the CPO statute, there may be instances in which the prospect of attorney's fees may be essential to enable a victim of domestic violence to bring and conduct the case."
Araya v. Keleta, 31 A.3d 78 (D.C. 2011)
Court should avoid unduly narrow focus in interpreting Intrafamily Offenses Act. The Intrafamily Offenses Act allows a Civil Protection Order to require a Respondent to vacate a family dwelling unit, irrespective of whether it is subject to equitable distribution in divorce proceedings.
“We conclude that the term “marital property,” as it exists in § 16–1005(c)(4), encompasses the “family dwelling unit,” regardless of technical ownership. This term is therefore independent of the parties' property rights under equitable distribution jurisprudence.” Keleta, 31 A.3d at 81.
Jordan v. Jordan (D.C. 2011)
Award of joint custody to CPO Respondent was proper when court properly weighs evidence of domestic violence in conducting custody determination.
“The trial court then found that the presumption against joint custody due to the intrafamily offenses was rebutted; and it discussed the seventeen statutory factors relevant to determining the best interest of a child, under D.C. Code § 16-914(a)(3) (2001). Moreover, the court's August 21, 2009, custody order is "a written statement... specifying factors and findings which support [the court's] determination" to award joint custody, under D.C. Code § 16-914(a-1) (2001). Thus, the trial court weighed the evidence of domestic violence and applied relevant statutory provisions in making its custody determination. This stands in stark contrast to Wilkins, where the court apparently did not consider the impact of the intrafamily offenses at all, and "did not explicitly consider the factors relevant to the best interest of the child determination." Jordan v. Jordan (D.C., 2011) at 22.
Assidon v. Abboushi (D.C. 2011)
Award of attorneys’ fees is proper when trial court is exercising emergency jurisdiction and retention of counsel was necessary to protect the interests of the child in a protective order case and custody case.
“The trial court's jurisdiction was premised on the emergency jurisdiction provision of the UCCJEA which authorizes the Superior Court to act where it is "necessary... to protect the child because the child,... or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." D.C. Code § 16-4602.04 (a). Here, the trial court acted to protect both the mother (by issuing a protective order against appellant) and the child (by providing for supervised visitation by the father). Appellant does not contest that the judge had emergency jurisdiction for such limited purposes under the UCCJEA. Therefore, in view of the emergency nature of the trial court's jurisdiction premised on protection of the child, it follows that the trial court had authority to grant attorney's fees if it concluded that retention of counsel "was necessary to protect the interests of the child.” Assidon v. Abboushi at 6.
“The court here noted that legal representation was "a must" due to the complexity of the case, and that it was in the child's best interest for his parents "to take steps to repair his damaged attachment to his father" through supervised visitation during the pendency of the order granting temporary custody to the mother. In light of the basis for the trial court's emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and the trial court's determination that assistance of counsel was required, we agree with the trial court that it had the authority to order an award of attorney's fees.” Assidon v. Abboushi at 6.
Hundley v. Johnston, 18 A.3d 802 (D.C. 2011)
A party to a CPO may recover attorneys’ fees under bad faith exception to general American Rule by demonstrating that the opposing party acted in bad faith by filing a frivolous action, or by litigating a properly filed action in a frivolous manner, when alleging the CPO was falsely filed.
“Johnston's bad faith, for purposes of the fee award, can be found in his actions before the complaint was filed. In sum, counsel limits his fee claim to alleged instances of bad faith appropriately drawn from this litigation, and only this litigation; but he asserts that evidence from sources outside this litigation—in particular, from the earlier partition action—can be relevant, and thus admissible, to prove Johnston's bad faith in the lawsuit we are considering here.” Johnston, 18 A.3d 802 at 808.
" Hundley proffered three instances of Johnston's bad faith, pertinent to the assault and battery litigation, each of which involved assessment of circumstances outside the courtroom. It may be true that these three allegations of bad faith are unimpressive on their face; absent further explanation, Johnston's procedural maneuvers at issue—failure to call a promised expert, withdrawal of the punitive damages claim, and failure to undergo a court-ordered medical exam—do not reflect the kinds of wanton, vexatious conduct commonly alleged in support of fee-shifting. Hundley's fee motion, however, clearly explained why these particular maneuvers fit into a much larger pattern of alleged bad faith than Johnston's assault and battery claim. They are not de minimis.” Johnston, 18 A.3d at 815.
Araya v. Keleta, 19 A.3d 358 (D.C. 2011)
Court of Appeals found that the trial court possessed authority to order husband to vacate the parties' residence after it issued a CPO, even though the property was titled solely in husband's name.
“Here, the uncontested evidence reveals that the New Jersey Property served as a family dwelling where the parties cohabitated as a married couple. It was unquestionably “marital property” within the construction we think must be given to the term. Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed.” Keleta, 19 A.3d at 361.
In re Shirley, 28 A.3d 506 (D.C. 2011)
Consent of the petitioner does not bar a conviction of criminal contempt for violation of a CPO.
“By declining to recognize consent as a defense to a charge of criminal contempt for violation of a CPO, we would not thereby render irrelevant evidence that it was a petitioner's conduct that placed a respondent in technical violation of a stay-away order. To be punishable, contempt of a CPO must be willful.” Shirley, 28 A.3d at 513.
“Thus, for example, if the evidence showed that the petitioner approached the respondent without his encouragement or consent, or that the contact was necessitated by an emergency, or that there was some type of “compelling humanitarian consideration” that justified the respondent in contacting the petitioner, the court might be unable to find that the respondent willfully violated the CPO.” Shirley, 28 A.3d at 513.
Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d 1148 (D.C. 2010)
Pro se litigants cannot recover attorney’s fees in the form of bad faith sanctions in CPO case.
“We held above that an attorney's fee under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 requires an attorney-client relationship, and expenses that have been incurred. Here, we hold that making the “prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy” also requires expenses that must actually be paid to a third party attorney. “Bad faith sanctions” have a similar underlying rationale as that of Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11-to deter misconduct in submissions to the court, and improper conduct in litigation in general.” Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d at 1169.
Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783 (D.C. 2008)
Rejected reasoning that CPO Petitioner’s obsessive, immature, and irrational conduct was responsible for CPO Respondent’s assault on Petitioner, therefore, reversing the order of CPO against Petitioner.
“The issuance of mutual CPO's in this case was improper. The suggestion that a victim of domestic violence brings the harm on herself or himself, shifts the responsibility for the abuse onto the victim and does not hold the abuser accountable. In most jurisdictions, before entering mutual protection orders, the trial court must find that both parties posed a threat and that there is sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the order as to each.” Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d at 791.
“The trial court should take into account the important policy consideration that awarding counsel fees helps domestic violence victims to overcome the financial barrier of high legal costs and to assert their right to bring action against their aggressors. Otherwise, some victims might be dissuaded or prevented from filing a CPO petition.” Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d at 793.
Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78 (D.C. 2005)
Court can order Respondent to vacate and stay away from jointly owned property near Petitioner’s residence thereby allowing safety concerns to trump property rights.
“Given the court's findings that Mr. Robinson had violated the CPO and there was a likelihood of future violence, its order requiring Mr. Robinson to vacate the marital home, but allowing him to live right next door, seems inadequate to accomplish the broad remedial purpose of the Intra-family Offenses Act, that is, to protect victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence.” Robinson 886 A.2d at 87
“In furtherance of this broad purpose, the Act clearly envisions allowing safety concerns to trump property rights. Although ordering a person to vacate his or her home or denying the use of owned property is a serious step, not to be lightly undertaken, when the trial court finds that intra-family offenses have been committed or are imminent, it can be a necessary measure to ensure peace and safety. While we do not believe that the trial court thought it was powerless to grant a stay-away order because Mr. Robinson had property rights in the house next to Mrs. Robinson's residence, the trial court appears to have placed significant reliance on Mr. Robinson's property rights in allowing him, a known abuser, to live within twelve feet of his wife, his repeated victim.” Robinson 886 A.2d at 87
Tyree v. Evans, 728 A.2d 101 (D.C. 1999)
In order to determine what, if any, relief is appropriate in a CPO case, the Court is bound to consider the entire mosaic. Court can place reasonable limits on cross examination but cannot preclude it altogether.
“Even under a remedial statute directed at domestic violence, the judge is obliged to apply established equitable principles. The prior conduct of the parties in a marital or quasi-marital relationship may well affect the appropriate outcome.” 728 A.2d at 195.
Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991)
The Intrafamily Offenses Act must be liberally construed in furtherance of its remedial purpose.
“A defendant's past conduct is important evidence—perhaps the most important—in predicting his probable future conduct.” Cruz–Foster, 597 A.2d at 930.
https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/titles/16/chapters/10/
Salvattera v. Ramirez,111 A.3d 1032, 1037 (D.C.2015) (“[T]he trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, should only enter a CPO against a party for reasons consistent with the underlying purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act.”) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted);
Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C.2005) (“[T]he broad remedial purpose of the Intrafamily Offenses Act ... is[ ] to protect victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence.”);
Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C.1993) (“The Intrafamily Offenses Act is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.”).
Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032, 1035 (D.C.2015)
This court has previously and consistently recognized that “the plain intent of the legislature [in amending the Intrafamily Offenses Act] was an expansive reading of the Act, which we think must be accorded to the catchall provision as well.”
Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973, 974 (D.C.1988). Moreover, the committee report described the catch-all provision as “a very broad one,” and the provision itself remained unchanged. Report on Bill 4–195 at 10 n.*.
DC Superior Court Rules
www.dccourts.gov/superior-court/rules
Cases
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)
In "true-threats" cases, the State must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of their statements’ threatening nature, but the First Amendment requires no more demanding a showing than recklessness.
Mashaud v. Boone, (D.C. 2023)
When speech is at issue, D.C.'s stalking statute only covers speech that fits within well-defined narrow classes that have traditionally been excepted from First Amendment protections, including threats, obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct. However, when the statute can be applied to contact or communications in a content-neutral manner (i.e. ignoring the content of communications), there is no First Amendment implication.
Carome v. Carome, (D.C. 2021)
The holding of Ramirez extends to initial determinations, specifically, a trial court must consider prior relevant acts in making the threshold determination of whether there is good cause to believe that an intrafamily offense occurred.
When a trial court revisits a CPO petition on remand based on an error in the original ruling, the trial court's renewed inquiry is not limited to whether its initial decision was correct based on the original record. The trial court may supplement to original record by considering evidence of any relevant developments that occurred in the time between the trial court's initial ruling on the CPO petition and the Court of Appeals' remand decision.
Mashaud v. Boone, (D.C. 2021)
Entry of CPO reversed and case remanded for the trial court to consider whether Respondent sending a series of emails and Facebook messages to Petitioner’s contacts discussing Respondent’s extramarital affair with Petitioner’s wife constituted stalking for the purposes of D.C. Code § 22-3133(a)(1)-(3) given that speech about matters of private concern may enjoy constitutional protection. D.C. Code § 22-3133(b) provides a statutory exception to the definition of stalking for constitutionally protected activity. The Court has not “delineated the contours of the statutory exception for ‘constitutionally protected activity,’ and the text of D.C. Code § 22-3133(b) does not provide an unambiguous answer.” The trial court erred in relying on the finding Respondent’s speech was related to a matter of private rather than public concern in determining it was not constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. In remanding, the Court notes they would not do so if they were “persuaded at this juncture that the CPO was invalid either because it violated appellant’s First Amendment rights or because the stalking statute did not apply to appellant’s activity,” and that “the trial court might have reached the same conclusion even if it had understood that communications about particular matters of private concern enjoy a measure of constitutional protection.”
Ramirez v. Salvaterra, (D.C. 2020)
A CPO can be extended if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence first that there is good cause to extend the CPO, based upon the entire mosaic of the case, meaning that there is a cognizable danger that the respondent will commit or threaten to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner in the coming year if the CPO is not extended, and second that the balance of the potential harms to each party merits an extension.
““Good cause” is defined as a cognizable danger that the respondent will commit or threaten to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner in the coming year if the CPO is not extended. In making this determination, the court must evaluate the entire mosaic of the case, including the parties’ relationship and interactions both before and after the issuance of the CPO and any prior extension of the CPO, as well as the parties’ current circumstances.” Ramirez v. Salvaterra at 3.
“In balancing the harms, the trial court should examine multiple factors, including, but not limited to, safety (and resulting peace of mind), restraints on liberty, restraints on property, family interests, social stigma, and other collateral consequences and relevant circumstances. The court may accord different weight to different potential harms, analyzing the totality of the circumstances to balance the harms and exercising its discretion to fashion a CPO extension that is tailored to the situation of the parties.” Ramirez v. Salvaterra, at 42.
Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d 983 (D.C. 2016)
Civil Protection Order based on parental kidnapping is proper when parent took child out of car and into office building for approximately three minutes.
“We see no basis for interpolating minimum duration or distance requirements into § 16–1022(b)(1), which by its terms extends to any abduction, taking, or carrying away, without regard to duration or distance. We have held with respect to the general kidnapping statute that there is no requirement that the victim be moved any particular distance or held for any particular length of time.” Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 988.
"We have never held or even suggested that proof of subjective fear by the CPO petitioner or anyone else is a prerequisite to issuance of a CPO." Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 989.
"[T]he conclusion that Ms. Fleet precipitated the incident neither justifies Mr. Fleet's response nor precludes the trial court from issuing a CPO based on the totality of the circumstances." Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 990.
"[A]" trial court considering whether to issue a CPO should “look at the entire mosaic of facts.” Fleet v. Fleet, 137 A.3d at 990.
Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032 (D.C. 2015)
The catch-all provision of the statute, in extraordinary circumstances, can be used to order a Respondent to vacate a dwelling, even if it is not a dwelling shared with Petitioner.
“We have long recognized that the Intrafamily Offenses Act “is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C.1993). Because a protection order “was designed to protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence,” the act “gives the court ‘a wider range of dispositional power.” Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d at 1034.
“[T]he trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, should only enter a CPO against a party for reasons consistent with the underlying purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act.” Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d at 1037.
Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super. 2014)
Petition for CPO denied when Respondent’s behavior did not exhibit a course of conduct to support a finding of violation of DC stalking statute.
"Respondent's flyers and website qualified as 'constitutionally protected activity' exempt from the District's stalking statute. D.C. Code § 22-3133(b)." Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super.,2014) at 5.
"[S]omeone who creates written messages and then delivers them directly to another person against the listener's wishes in order to, or in a manner he knew would, upset the listener could be found guilty of stalking. This could be so even if the content of the speaker's message and methods of communication resemble traditionally protected speech." Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super.,2014) at 14.
“The evidence presented at trial contained not nearly enough proof that Respondent engaged in such a course of conduct to support a finding that he violated the District's criminal stalking statute. Petitioner's contention that Respondent created and distributed the flyers in order to expose Petitioner to them12 was largely undermined by the fact that Respondent did not attempt to deliver them directly to Petitioner in her office (where, in fact, he is legally obligated to go on a regular basis); rather, Respondent left the flyers in locations where others, not Petitioner herself, found them.” Gray v. Sobin (D.C. Super.,2014) at 16.
A.S. v. Cannady (D.C. Super. 2014)
CPO granted when Respondent scratched Petitioner’s car after the end of their romantic relationship due to threatening nature of the act.
"[W]here an act of destruction of property potentially serves as a precursor to, threat or instigator of, or substitution for violence, or otherwise comprises part of a violent or intimidating pattern of domination and control, the issuance of a CPO would properly serve the IFA's broad goals of "protect[ing] victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence," Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C. 2005) (citation omitted), and of reducing "physical, sexual or emotional violence," Richardson, 878 A.2d at 1217 n.6. Where, however, such factors are not present, and the act of destroying or damaging property appears unconnected to violence, possible violence, or a pattern of control, issuance of a CPO based upon a finding of malicious destruction of property would not comport with the statute's goals, and would thus not be proper." A.S. v. Cannady (D.C. Super., 2014) at 10.
Cave v. Scheulov, 64 A.3d 190 (D.C. 2013)
Reaffirmed the two-step approach for granting fees in a Civil Protection Order case: (1) whether to award fees, (2) and if so, how much. The factors for the first step should not include "oppressive or burdensome litigation" but should include "motivation and behavior." The factors for the first step should also include "results obtained" and the policy considerations of the Intrafamily Offenses Act.
"Based on the policy underlying the CPO statute, there may be instances in which the prospect of attorney's fees may be essential to enable a victim of domestic violence to bring and conduct the case."
Araya v. Keleta, 31 A.3d 78 (D.C. 2011)
Court should avoid unduly narrow focus in interpreting Intrafamily Offenses Act. The Intrafamily Offenses Act allows a Civil Protection Order to require a Respondent to vacate a family dwelling unit, irrespective of whether it is subject to equitable distribution in divorce proceedings.
“We conclude that the term “marital property,” as it exists in § 16–1005(c)(4), encompasses the “family dwelling unit,” regardless of technical ownership. This term is therefore independent of the parties' property rights under equitable distribution jurisprudence.” Keleta, 31 A.3d at 81.
Jordan v. Jordan (D.C. 2011)
Award of joint custody to CPO Respondent was proper when court properly weighs evidence of domestic violence in conducting custody determination.
“The trial court then found that the presumption against joint custody due to the intrafamily offenses was rebutted; and it discussed the seventeen statutory factors relevant to determining the best interest of a child, under D.C. Code § 16-914(a)(3) (2001). Moreover, the court's August 21, 2009, custody order is "a written statement... specifying factors and findings which support [the court's] determination" to award joint custody, under D.C. Code § 16-914(a-1) (2001). Thus, the trial court weighed the evidence of domestic violence and applied relevant statutory provisions in making its custody determination. This stands in stark contrast to Wilkins, where the court apparently did not consider the impact of the intrafamily offenses at all, and "did not explicitly consider the factors relevant to the best interest of the child determination." Jordan v. Jordan (D.C., 2011) at 22.
Assidon v. Abboushi (D.C. 2011)
Award of attorneys’ fees is proper when trial court is exercising emergency jurisdiction and retention of counsel was necessary to protect the interests of the child in a protective order case and custody case.
“The trial court's jurisdiction was premised on the emergency jurisdiction provision of the UCCJEA which authorizes the Superior Court to act where it is "necessary... to protect the child because the child,... or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." D.C. Code § 16-4602.04 (a). Here, the trial court acted to protect both the mother (by issuing a protective order against appellant) and the child (by providing for supervised visitation by the father). Appellant does not contest that the judge had emergency jurisdiction for such limited purposes under the UCCJEA. Therefore, in view of the emergency nature of the trial court's jurisdiction premised on protection of the child, it follows that the trial court had authority to grant attorney's fees if it concluded that retention of counsel "was necessary to protect the interests of the child.” Assidon v. Abboushi at 6.
“The court here noted that legal representation was "a must" due to the complexity of the case, and that it was in the child's best interest for his parents "to take steps to repair his damaged attachment to his father" through supervised visitation during the pendency of the order granting temporary custody to the mother. In light of the basis for the trial court's emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and the trial court's determination that assistance of counsel was required, we agree with the trial court that it had the authority to order an award of attorney's fees.” Assidon v. Abboushi at 6.
Hundley v. Johnston, 18 A.3d 802 (D.C. 2011)
A party to a CPO may recover attorneys’ fees under bad faith exception to general American Rule by demonstrating that the opposing party acted in bad faith by filing a frivolous action, or by litigating a properly filed action in a frivolous manner, when alleging the CPO was falsely filed.
“Johnston's bad faith, for purposes of the fee award, can be found in his actions before the complaint was filed. In sum, counsel limits his fee claim to alleged instances of bad faith appropriately drawn from this litigation, and only this litigation; but he asserts that evidence from sources outside this litigation—in particular, from the earlier partition action—can be relevant, and thus admissible, to prove Johnston's bad faith in the lawsuit we are considering here.” Johnston, 18 A.3d 802 at 808.
" Hundley proffered three instances of Johnston's bad faith, pertinent to the assault and battery litigation, each of which involved assessment of circumstances outside the courtroom. It may be true that these three allegations of bad faith are unimpressive on their face; absent further explanation, Johnston's procedural maneuvers at issue—failure to call a promised expert, withdrawal of the punitive damages claim, and failure to undergo a court-ordered medical exam—do not reflect the kinds of wanton, vexatious conduct commonly alleged in support of fee-shifting. Hundley's fee motion, however, clearly explained why these particular maneuvers fit into a much larger pattern of alleged bad faith than Johnston's assault and battery claim. They are not de minimis.” Johnston, 18 A.3d at 815.
Araya v. Keleta, 19 A.3d 358 (D.C. 2011)
Court of Appeals found that the trial court possessed authority to order husband to vacate the parties' residence after it issued a CPO, even though the property was titled solely in husband's name.
“Here, the uncontested evidence reveals that the New Jersey Property served as a family dwelling where the parties cohabitated as a married couple. It was unquestionably “marital property” within the construction we think must be given to the term. Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed.” Keleta, 19 A.3d at 361.
In re Shirley, 28 A.3d 506 (D.C. 2011)
Consent of the petitioner does not bar a conviction of criminal contempt for violation of a CPO.
“By declining to recognize consent as a defense to a charge of criminal contempt for violation of a CPO, we would not thereby render irrelevant evidence that it was a petitioner's conduct that placed a respondent in technical violation of a stay-away order. To be punishable, contempt of a CPO must be willful.” Shirley, 28 A.3d at 513.
“Thus, for example, if the evidence showed that the petitioner approached the respondent without his encouragement or consent, or that the contact was necessitated by an emergency, or that there was some type of “compelling humanitarian consideration” that justified the respondent in contacting the petitioner, the court might be unable to find that the respondent willfully violated the CPO.” Shirley, 28 A.3d at 513.
Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d 1148 (D.C. 2010)
Pro se litigants cannot recover attorney’s fees in the form of bad faith sanctions in CPO case.
“We held above that an attorney's fee under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 requires an attorney-client relationship, and expenses that have been incurred. Here, we hold that making the “prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy” also requires expenses that must actually be paid to a third party attorney. “Bad faith sanctions” have a similar underlying rationale as that of Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11-to deter misconduct in submissions to the court, and improper conduct in litigation in general.” Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d at 1169.
Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783 (D.C. 2008)
Rejected reasoning that CPO Petitioner’s obsessive, immature, and irrational conduct was responsible for CPO Respondent’s assault on Petitioner, therefore, reversing the order of CPO against Petitioner.
“The issuance of mutual CPO's in this case was improper. The suggestion that a victim of domestic violence brings the harm on herself or himself, shifts the responsibility for the abuse onto the victim and does not hold the abuser accountable. In most jurisdictions, before entering mutual protection orders, the trial court must find that both parties posed a threat and that there is sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the order as to each.” Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d at 791.
“The trial court should take into account the important policy consideration that awarding counsel fees helps domestic violence victims to overcome the financial barrier of high legal costs and to assert their right to bring action against their aggressors. Otherwise, some victims might be dissuaded or prevented from filing a CPO petition.” Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d at 793.
Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78 (D.C. 2005)
Court can order Respondent to vacate and stay away from jointly owned property near Petitioner’s residence thereby allowing safety concerns to trump property rights.
“Given the court's findings that Mr. Robinson had violated the CPO and there was a likelihood of future violence, its order requiring Mr. Robinson to vacate the marital home, but allowing him to live right next door, seems inadequate to accomplish the broad remedial purpose of the Intra-family Offenses Act, that is, to protect victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence.” Robinson 886 A.2d at 87
“In furtherance of this broad purpose, the Act clearly envisions allowing safety concerns to trump property rights. Although ordering a person to vacate his or her home or denying the use of owned property is a serious step, not to be lightly undertaken, when the trial court finds that intra-family offenses have been committed or are imminent, it can be a necessary measure to ensure peace and safety. While we do not believe that the trial court thought it was powerless to grant a stay-away order because Mr. Robinson had property rights in the house next to Mrs. Robinson's residence, the trial court appears to have placed significant reliance on Mr. Robinson's property rights in allowing him, a known abuser, to live within twelve feet of his wife, his repeated victim.” Robinson 886 A.2d at 87
Tyree v. Evans, 728 A.2d 101 (D.C. 1999)
In order to determine what, if any, relief is appropriate in a CPO case, the Court is bound to consider the entire mosaic. Court can place reasonable limits on cross examination but cannot preclude it altogether.
“Even under a remedial statute directed at domestic violence, the judge is obliged to apply established equitable principles. The prior conduct of the parties in a marital or quasi-marital relationship may well affect the appropriate outcome.” 728 A.2d at 195.
Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991)
The Intrafamily Offenses Act must be liberally construed in furtherance of its remedial purpose.
“A defendant's past conduct is important evidence—perhaps the most important—in predicting his probable future conduct.” Cruz–Foster, 597 A.2d at 930.